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THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE PARALOGISM
[From the American Law Review for April.]
On Dec. 13th, 1769, George III granted a charter to John Wentworth, Governor of the Province of New Hampshire, Eleazei
Wheelock and ten others, incorporating them and their successors
into Dartmouth College, and conferring on them as such college
the power to appoint professors, prescribe courses of study, suE
and be sued, acquire and dispose of property. The site of operations was to be in the western part of the province. The college
was organized under the charter and has continued thereunder tc
this day. In 1816, the legislature of New Hampshire passed twc
acts modifying the composition of the corporation, increasing the
number of members, called trustees, from twelve to twenty-one, of
whom the additional nine were to be appointed by the Governoi
of the State, and creating a board of twenty-five overseers, who
should have control over the trustees, and should exercise a large
part of the powers hitherto possessed by them. The overseers
were to be the president of the senate, the speaker of the house of
representatives of New Hampshire, the Governor and LieutenantGovernor of Vermont, and twenty-one other persons to be appointed
by the Governor and council of New Hampshire. The name of the
institution was changed from Dartmouth College to Dartmouth
University. Woodward who had been secretary and treasurer
under the college was appointed to the same place by those who.
under the act of 1816 regarded themselves the corporation, and
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accepting office under this appointment, retained the books, the
papers, the charter and the common seal of the college. A majoritv of the Trustees of the college, denying -the validity of this legislation, instituted an action of trover against him, in the state court.
That court, and the highest court of the State, on appeal, sustaining the appointment of Woodward, under the modified charter,
the case was removed by writ of error to the Supreme Court of tht
United States.1
It was objected against the legislation of 1816, that it was in
excess of the power conferred by the constitution of New Hampshire upon its legislature, but alleged transgression of the state
constitution presents no federal question and the decision of the
state judiciary was on this point, conclusive. It was necessary for
the plaintiff in error to convince the Supreme Court of the United
States, that the legislation of 1816 was in some way violative ol
the Federal Constitution.
Among the inhibitions upon States found in the Constitution
of the U.nited States, is that which is found in Section 10, of Ar-,
ticle 1: "No state shall * * * pass any * * * law impairing the obligation of contracts." The plaintiff in error, Dartmouth College.
alleged that the acts of the New Hampshire legislature of 1816,
infringed this provision. It was necessary for him therefore to
show that the original charter was a contract; that there cleaved
to it an obligation; and that the law reformatory of the college
impaired this obligation.
What did the word "contract" in the thought of the framers
and adopters of the constitution, mean? In the commentaries of
Blackstone, which had early a considerable vogue in the American
colonies and states, a contract. is defined "an agreement, upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to do a particular thing.2 ' A
contract, said Marshall, C. J.. in Fletcher v. Peck, 3 is "a compact
between two or more parties, and is either executory or executed.
An executory contract is one in which a party binds himself tc
do or not to do a particular thing. * * * * A contract executed is
one in which the object of contract is performed." The definition,
Powell's, adopted by Washington, J., in the case now under consideration, is "a transaction between two or more persons in which
'Dartmouth

College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518.

2 2 Comm. 442.

8 2 Cr. 87. This definition was adopted by Story, J., in Dartmouth College v. Woodward.
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each party comes under an obligation to the other, and each reciprocally acquires a right to whatever is promised by the other."'
If the charter of Dec. 13th, 1769 was a contract, there must
have been at least two parties to it. Who were they? The grantor
was, ostensibly, the King of Great Britain. Was he, as the individual, the real party? Or did he act for the political corporation
called Great Britain? Or did he act for the political corporation
known as -the Province of New Hampshire? It will probably not
be seriously contended "that George III. granted the charter as al
individual. He held a definite place in the British constitution;
and it was in virtue of his tenure of- that place that he exercised
the administrative power of incorporating in New Hampshire, ;
subordinate province. In applying for incorporation to the distant King, its Governor, Wentworth, and his copetitioners, conceded that the power to incorparate was with the king, and not in
the provincial assembly or in Wentworth as the king's appointee.
Although the elaborate opinions of the Justices of the Supreme
Court, do not distinctly inform us, we shall probably not be wrong
if we assume that, had they chosen to answer the question, they
would have said that the King in issuing the charter, acted as the
representative of Great Britain, which, if the charter was a contract, became one of the parties thereto . Marshall, C. J., assumes
that the transcendent power of parliment to dissolve corporations
could have been exerted upon Dartmouth College 2as upon corporations erected within Great Britain itself.
Who was the other party to the contract? The charter was a
grant and the effectiveness of the grant depended, not merely on the
will of the grantor, but also on that of the grantee, manifested by
his acceptance. The corporation was the product of the joint wills
of grantor and grantee. It was, then, not the grantee.' It coulrl
not exist until there had been an acceptance and there could not
be an acceptance. until the acceptor was in being. The offer of cor.
porate privilege and power, was made not to the corporation but
to Wentworth, Wheelock and the rest. Both corporate being and
the various corporate powers were offered together, and accepted
together. There was no interval of time between the coming into
existence of the being, and the coming into existence, of thesa
powers, the power, e. g. to sue and be sued, to acquire, hold and
dispose of property, to lay out a plan of instruction, to appoint
1 4 Wheat. 518.
2 4 Wheat. 643;

651.
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professors.1 The contract, if there was one, was between Great
Britain and Wentworth et aliis. This is realized by Chief Justice
Marshall when he remarks 2 "Those who are no longer interested in
the property (i. e. which was given to the corporation) may yet
retain such an interest in the preservation of their own arrangements (i. e. as defined in the charter) as to have a right to insist
that these arrangements shall be held sacred." Gifts were made to
the College subsequently to 1769, and it is intimated that Great
Britain, through the crown, might be deemed to make a contract
with the donor, at the making of such gift, to allow it to be a dministered by the agents and in the manner, indicated in the charter.
But, as far as appears, the original donees of the charter, and
the subsequent donors to the corporation, have gone out of existence. Has the charter become, thereby, a unilateral contract? If
these persons have disappeared, says Marshall, C. J., "it becomes
a subject of serious and anxious inquiry whether those whom they
have legally empowered to represent them forever, may not assert
all the rights which they possessed, while in being; whether if
they be without personal representatives who may feel injured by
a violation of the compact, the trustees be not so completely their'
representatives, in the eye of the law, as to stand in their place,
not only as respects the government of the college, but also as
respects the maintenance of the college charter." ie later affirms
that these persons with whom the Crown has made the contract,
"are represented by the corporation.
The corporation is the
assignee of their rights, stands in their place and distributes their
bounty as they would themselves have distributed it, had they been
immortal." A new process of succession is thus invented; unlike
that of a surviving partner, or joint tenant; or that of an executor
or administrator. The corporation which is the creature of the
acceptance by A, B and C, of a charter granted to them, instantly
displaces them in the contract, which must now be treated as if
made by the chartering power with it, and not with them. By
this logical saltation, the corporation is able to allege that the act
by which it came into being is a contract with itself.
The other party to the contract was Great Britain. Ib continues to exist. Are the obligations of the contract still upon it?
1Justice Story's remarks, 4 Wheat. 691, though directed to showing
that there was a contract between the Crown and the corporation, do not
show it.
2 4 Wheat. 630.
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A corporation, it has been held, has a fixed habitation whence it
cannot migrate. The college was a British corporation. While it
had no New Hampshire habitat the college buildings were to be
in that province, instruction was to be imparted there, the trustees
were residents there. Concerning the interesting question how the
duties imposed by the contract upon the Crown were transferred
to New Hampshire, surprisingly little is said in the discussion of
the court. Marshall, C. J., contents himself with the remark, "This
is plainly a contract to wliich the donors ,the trustees and the Crown
(to whose rights and obligations New Hampshire succeeds) were
the original parties," and Story. J., in reply to the suggestion that
the charter of the college was dissolved at the Revolution, simply
says that "It is a principle of the common law, which has been
recognized as well in this as in other courts, that the division of
an empire works no forfeiture of previously vested rights of property. And this maxim is equally consonant with the common sen'-e
of mankind and the maxims of eternal justice."
The question before the court was not, whether the legislation
of 1816 deprived Dartmouth College of "property" but whether
it impaired the obligation of a contract. If the Revolution had
extinguished Great Britain's contract it had also extinguished the
obligation of it. If it transferred the contract and its obligation to
New Hampshire, there was still possibility of the impairment of it.
Does a revolution effect this transfer? It was hardly settled that it
did, when the case was before the court, and the question is still
far from having reached a definite solution.' It is assumed, however, that the contract on the part of the British drown, to refrain
from modifying the composition of the Dartmouth College corporation in some way attached itself to the new sovereignty, New
Hampshire, in 17T6.
What was the "obligation" of that contract. By the "obligation" of a contract we are not to understand the moral obligation
to perform it. Strong as is the State, it cannot destroy moral obligations except such as are owed to itself, and as it may remit.
"Even if it be admitted," said Trimble, J.,2 "that the moral law
necessarily attaches to the agreement, that would not bring it withiu
the meaning of the constitution. Moral obligations are those arising from the admonition of conscience and accountability to the
Taylor, Internat. Law, 205.
2 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 318.
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Supreme Being. No human law-giver can impair them. They are
entirely foreign from the purpose of the Constitution. The constitution evidently contemplated an obligation which might be impaired by a law of the state, if not prohibited by the Constitution."
What then is the "obligation" of the contract? Some agreements the state does not require a party to perform. They may be
gratuitous. They may not have been expressed in a prescribed
form. They may have had an unlawful purpose. They may have
been procured by fraud, duress, mistake. Such agreements have no
"obligation." There are agreements which the state will oblige a
party to perform either specifically or otherwise; to do the exact
thing defined in the contracts or some other thing as a compensation
for it. It obliges in various modes. It may imprison the party
because he has not performed or until he does perform. It may
impose fines and other penalties upon him. It may allow the creditor to distrain his goods; to take possession of his land; to sell it.
and obtain compensation from the proceeds. The purpose of the
state to furnish these methods of securing performance, makes performance to a degree, necessaryi "obliges" performance. The "obligation" of the contract, is the subjection of the party to the peril
of loss, and to the actual loss, of liberty or property, by the state's
power.
A, let us suppose, agrees to pay B, $1000. If the state will not
coerce A in any way, by arrest and detention, by seizure or sale of
goods or land; if it will not allow B to punish A for his refusal
to pay, to distrain A's goods, etc., A's promise has "obligation" in
foro oonscientiae," but it has no "obligation" in the constitutional
sense. If,however, when the promise is made, the state's purpose
is to allow B, on the failure of A to perform, to arrest him, to
seize his goods, to use or to sell them, there is on A an "obligation"
to perform. "The language of the constitution plainly suppose-s
that the obligation of a contract is something not wholly depending
upon the will of the parties. It incontestably supposes the obligation to be something which attaches to and lays hold of the contract, and which, by some superior external power, regulates and
controls the conduct of parties in relation to the contract; it evidently supposes that superior external power to rest in the will of
the legislature."'
Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Cf. Barnitz v. Beverly, 153 U. S.
118; Bradley v. Lightcap, 195 U. S. 1; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608;
Bronston v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311.

THE FORUM

153

A very little reflection will discover that there can be no such
"obligation" upon a sovereign state or nation. "Obligation" consists in the purpose and readiness of a person, natural or artificial.
other than the, party to the agreement, to produce disagreeable
effects, if the party omits to do what he has promised. Who stood
outside of and above Great Britain to coerce it into compliance with
its implied promise not to retract or to modify the charter of Dartmouth College? "The power of a sovereign number," says Austin,
"is incapable of legal limitation. For a monarch or sovereign number bound by a legal duty would be subject to a higher or superior
sovereign; contrary to the hypothesis involved in the definition of
the terms monarch and sovereign number. * * * Monarchs and sovereign bodies have attempted to oblige themselves, or to oblige the
successors to their sovereign powers. But in spite of such attempts,
the position that sovereign power is incapable of legal limitations
holds without excepton."I "It being moreover," remarks Markby, 2
"the essential nature of a duty, that it is the result of a command.
it follows that it is necessarily imposed upon some person other
than the person who issues the command. No man, except by a
strong figure of speech, can be said to issue commands to himself.
Every legal duty, therefore, is imposed by the sovereign body on
some person other than itself."I A State may admit that it ought
to do thus and thus, and may declare that it will do thus and thus.
It may be already under, or by its acts and promises, it may put
itself under, a moral duty. But this is not the obligation of a contract. The moral duty it cannot impair by legislation and if it
could, there could be no serious objection anywhere, to the extin-tion of a moral duty; for that presumably cannot occur, except
with the consent of God, and we cannot afford to be better than He.
Under other than moral obligations a sovereign body politic cannot
be.
While the King of Great Britain was its agent for the granting,
he was not its agent for the revoking, of charters. He could not
I Province of Jurisprudence, 150.
2 Elements of Law, 92.
3Holland says "Indeed it is not improper to talk of the state as having
duties, namely such as it prescribes to itself, though it has the physical
power to disregard and the constitutional power to repudiate them." Elements of Jurisprudence p. 109. But this can mean only that the state
ought to do certain things, not that 't is under any external stress or compulsion."
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retract a charter.' But it would be preposterous to suppose that
there was power nowhere, to cancel or modify a charter once granted. "A corporation," said Backstone, 2 "may be dissolved by act
of Parliment, which is boundless in its operations." Marshall,C.
I., concedes, in the case under investigation, that the British Parliment was omnipotent, and that it could "annul corporate rights.'
Every charter was under the British system, merely a revocable
license. Those who accepted it, accepted it with knowledge that
it could be recalled whenever the kingdom acting through parliment, thought fit to do so. To speak of legal obligation on the
British state, to refrain from recalling or altering a charter, would
be fatuous. To say even that there was a moral obligation upon it,
to refrain from recalling a charter which the recipients of it knew
to be recallable, would be scarcely less. In short, prior to the Revolution there was neither legal nor moral obligation on the part of
Great Britain, to allow the charter to continue, or to abstain from
amending it. Wentworth, WVheelock et alii were, and knew that
they were, mere licensees of the kingdom.
Was the revocable nature of the charter changed at the Revolution . An attempt was made by Webster, counsel for Dartmouth
College, to convince the Court that only the regal and not the parlimentary power. with respect to charters, passed to the legislature
of New Hampshire. "The legislature of New Hampshire has;" lie
argues, "the same power over this charter which belonged to the
king, who granted it, and no more." He does not contend that the
whole power of Great Britain did not pass to the State itself, but
simply that the State had not given to its legislature more of this
power, than Great Britain, under its constitution, had given to the
king. But this question concerning the partition of the powers
of the state of New Hampshire among the organs of its government
was a state and not a federal question; and the decision of the
State Court upon this point could not be examined by the Supreme
Court of the United States. The only question there, was not, did
New Hampshire pass any law? Was the act of its legislature a
law? But did that law impair a contract?
The concession by C. J. Marshall is distinct, that "By the Revolution the duties as well as the powers of government, devolved
on the people of New Hampshire. It is admitted that among the
1 Rex v. Amley, 2 Term R. 532.

21 Comm. 485.
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well as that of the executive department."' It follows that, as
Great Britain could revoke the charter, so could New Hampshire.
There was no legal, there was no moral, obligation on the former
to refrain from doing that which by the immemorial constitution
of the kingdom it could do, and which every person accepting a
charter knew that it could do. As well say that when A licenses
B to cross his field until further notice, the notice is a breach of
duty, as that when a charter is granted with the knowledge that
its continuation depends on the continuation of the volition of tha
kingdom, a wrong is done, when that volition ceases. But, if there
could be question as to the moral obligation not to revoke a charter,
there can be none as to the utter absence of legal obligation. Tt
follows that when in 1776 New Hampshire became an independent
state, its contract with the Dartmouth College had no "obligation"
in the constitutional sense of that word. Says Marshall, C. J., "A
repeal of this charter (by New Hampshire) at any time prior to
the adoption of the present constitution of the United States, would
have been an extraordinary and unprecedented act of power but one
which could .have been contested only by the restriction upon the
legislature, to be found in the constitution of the state." It is scarcely needful to observe that the extraordinariness of a law, is no objection to it, if it be within the power of the body which passes it. However unusual the revocation or alteration of a charter may be, if the
power to revoke or alter exists, none can complain of them. The
recipients of the Dartmouth College charter, took it with knowledge
that the British parliment could repeal it at any time. The corporation retained it, after the Revolution with knowledge that New
Hampshire could repeal it at any time. They knew that so far as
the British kingdom, or the state was concerned, it was a mere
license, which could not become anything else, because it was termed
a charter of incorporation, nor because property was transferred to
the corporation in reliance upon its continuance. Those who pay
a consideration for a revocable license do not ipso facto render it
irrevocable.
New Hampshire ratified the constitution on June 21st, 1788.
Eight States had already ratified it. The Constitution then, according to its Article VII, was thereby established. Did this ratification make charters irrepealable, that previously could have
been repealed? It is not pretended that there is anything in the
14

Wheat.

651.
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Constitution that could produce this result, save the section concerning laws impairing the obligation of contracts.
It is quite clear that, when a contract made in a state, has
under its law, no legal obligatoriness, this clause does not add obligation to it. The state may still determine the condition under
which a contract shall be binding. It may require that it be expressed in writing; or that it be sealed, or that there shall be a
consideration, or that the party shall not be a minor, or of feeble
mind, or that it be free from duress. The obligation of a contract
depends on the law existing when it is made and that law condi6ions and limits it.' No one can make a contract, which under the
existing law will be enforceable only to a certain degree, and then
insist that it be enforced, or enforced beyond the degree, on the
ground that the existing law impaired its obligation. There must
first be an obligation; and this must come from the law. It is
only by later laws that this obligation can be impaired. 2 If then,
the federal constitution does not make obligatory a contract which
is not, when made, obligatory by the state law, how did it happen
that it made obligatory contracts already in existence when it was
adopted, but which by the then state law had not been of "obligation?" A state, let us suppose, had in 1787, a law which required
parties to contracts of a certain class to be twenty-five years of age.
Such a contract with one under twenty-five years was in existence
on January 1st, 1788. It was not enforceable. The constitution
began to operate on June 21st, 1788. By what magic did it impart
an obligation to this contract? It forbids a state law impairing
the obligation, but it doesnot say that contracts which have heretofore not possessed obligation shall now possess it, and shall be enforced in state courts. If the enactment of the constitution gave
obligation to contracts which did not possess it, to what sorts of
contracts? To those voidable because not written? To those voidable because of infancy, duress, fraud, illegality of object, lack of
consideration? Why single out terminable contracts and say that
the constitution made them interminable? Or licenses, and say
that they were converted into irrepealable gifts?
It was possible for a state, after it had made certain contracti
binding, to remove, or restrict the obligation of them, and their
apparent purpose in adopting the prohibition of clause 10, Art. I.

'Pinney

v. Neilson, 188 I. S. 144;
2Lehigh Water Co. v. Borough of Easton, 121 U. S. 388;
Bennett, 128 U. S. 489.

Denny v.
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obligation that they had created. It is difficult to believe that they
intended to make promises themselves to do or to refrain from
doing certain things which were theretofore retractable and destitute of obligation, incapable of withdrawal. The words of the 10th
section of Article I do not attempt to give "obligation" but to prevent the lessening or extinction of "obligation" which has been in
existence in virtue of state law.
There is a suggestion by Marshall, C. J.. in Fletcher v. Peck'
that the provision in the 3rd Article of the Constitution for federal
judicial power in controversies between two or more states. between
a.state and citizens of another state, between a state and foreign
states, citizens or subjects, implies that federal coercion may be
brought to bear on a state in order to compel it to perform its contracts. The reply is furnished by the Chief Justice himself. The
nation did not understand that it had given power to the central
judiciary to coerce a state, at the suit of an individual or corporation, and as soon as it realized that that judiciary was of opinion
that it had, the eleventh amendment destroyed the pretense of such
power.
The suggestion was made by Story, J., that if a state reserved,
when granting a charter, the right to terminate or modify it, such
termination or modification would be within its competence. The
suggestion was early acted upon. It became the fashion for legislatures to pass general laws to the effect that all charters thereafter
granted should be repealable or alterable 2 and state constitutions
contain a similar provision. The only object of such a law or constitution is, to give notice to all persons that charters granted will
be subject to the power of recall or modification. How does it matter in what form this notice is given? Many constitutional principles are unwritten, but are as well known and as operative, as if
written. That one legislature can repeal an act of an earlier legislature, that an act of Congress can repeal an earlier treaty are unwritten principles. It was as clearly fixed under the British constitution, that Parliment was omnipotent, and that any charter
might be revoked or changed by it. This principle lay behind all
special acts of legislation. What greater sanction would it have
obtained, if it had been expressed in a statute? Or what better
Cr. 87.
Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 489;
Co., 105 U. S. 13.
16
2

Greenwood v. Union Freight R. R.
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notice would the recipient of a charter have had of it? This principle, of the repealability of a charter, passed, with sovereignty,
to New Hampshire. and every one obtaining a charter from the
state, or operating under one of British grant, was as well aware
that it might be withdrawn at any time, as if a thousand statutes
had declared that it might. It is somewhat puerile to distinguish
between an express and an implied condition, and especially when
the expression of the condition may be in an ancient statute or constitution. and not in the charter itself. If every purchaser of a
charter must know the old statute which says that all charters shall
be revocable, why should he not be compelled to know, what is
equally knowable, the unwritten, a prioi political principle, that
the state cannot "oblige" itself; and that all its charters may be
recalled? He is bound to know that the police power' or th eminent domain 2 cannot be bargained away although neither statute
nor constitution so declares, and that charters are received subject
to the exercise thereof.$ Why is he not bound to know that the
state also grants its charters subject to the condition that they can
be at any time revoked?
Dartmouth College v. Woodward has prevented the alteration
or revocation of the charters that had been issued prior to the decision. In so far as it has interfered with control of corporations by
the states, its effect has been largely pernicious. It has tended to exalt
chartered associations above the state and the people. If the device
of charming the court into innocuousness. by the use of constitutional or statutory assertions of repealability had not been adopted,
a reversal of the decision- would have been imperatively necessary.
By the use of this device, for fifty years the state's power over
its corporations has been as great as if the decision had never been
rendered, at the cost simply of the enactment, either by the people
or by the assemblies, of a general declaratory phrase. Few constitutional adjudications have been more talked about, and few
have been more inept.
WiLimA

TRicKETr.

Butchers Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746; Cooly, Const.
Lim. 399.
2Cooly, Const. Lim. 397.
s Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 U. S. 25; Douglass v. Kentucky, 168 U.
S. 488.
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MOOT COURT
MARTIN vs. DOUGLAS, ET AL.

Strike-Boycott-Labor Unions and Employers' Associations-When Strikes
Are Unlawful-Acts of Assembly Relating to Labor Unions Discussed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Martin, the plaintiff, Is an electrician. The defendants are the officers
and members of an association of electricians. Martin was not a member of
the Association and his application for membership had been refused. The
Association resolved not to buy electrical supplies from any manufacturer
who sold to electricians who were not members of the association. Notice
to this effect has been served upon the few manufacturers of such supplies
and they have been supplied with lists of the members of the association.
Martin, as a result, has been forced out of business. He brings this actioi
of trespass and also files a bill seeking that the defendants be decreed to
recall the notices mentioned.
Arnold for the plaintiff.
Hicks for the defendants.
The fact that employers and dealers, defendants, told other dealers that
they would not buy from them if they furnished materials to plaintiffs, was
not such coercion and threats as constituted acts of combination unlawful.
Cote vs. Murphy, 159 Pa. 420; Bradley vs. Pierson, 108 Pa. 502; Mogul S.
S. Co. vs. McGregor, 37 L. R. A. 459.
Past injuries are in themselves no ground for an injunction which is to
prevent further mischief. Sweenev vs. Torrence, 1 Pa. Dist. 622; Mammoth Vein Consol Coal Co's. Appeal, 54 Pa. 183.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
CLARK, J.:-The defendants were officers and members of an assoclathon of electricians. The association resolved not to buy electrical supplies
from any manufacturer who sold to electricians who were not members of
the association. Notice to this effect was served upon the manufacturers,
and they were supplied with lists of those who were members of the asso
elation. Martin, the plaintiff, as a result has been forced out of business.
He brings this action of trespass and also files a bill seeking that the defendants be decreed to recall the notices above mentioned.
After a careful perusal of the decisions in this and other states we are
convinced that the plaintiff cannot recover in this case. At common law this
would be a conspiracy and would be Indictable. But under the acts of 1869,
1872, 1876 and 1891, employes acting together, may, with few exceptions.
lawfully do all these things which the common law declared a conspiracy.
We hold It Is the right of labor, to withhold Its patronage and favor from
its enemies, and to bestow them on its friends.
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No man can compel another to trade with him, to have friendly intercourse with him, or to confer benefits upon him.
We have a right to choose our tailor, grocer, butcher, shoemaker, etc..
we do not think that any court in the United States will deny this proposition.
Further we assert that what each individual member of an association
may legally do, the association as a body may legally do. They had a right
to dissuade others from patronizing them if they sold to the plaintiff; so
long as the methods they employed were not of the class of which are fraud,
misrepresentation, intimidation, coercion, obstruction or molestation.
The act complained of in this case was not of this class. To notify the
manufacturers that they would not buy from them if they sold to the plain
tiff is not a threat in the legal conception of the term. It does -not interfere with the dealer's free choice; he may have considered which would b,
more profitable and acted accordingly.
Judgment for the defendants and bill dismissed.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
William Draper Lewis has defined a boycott as "economic pressui.
brought to bear on those who deal, or are about to deal, in a business war
with a third person to prevent others from dealing with such third person."
Am. Law Reg. Vol. 44 N. S. p. 465. The case at bar is a typical boycott.
The defendants announced to the manufacturers of electrical supplies that
it they continued to sell to anyone not on a list of names sent to them,
they would lose as customers all the members of the association of which
d(efendants are members. The minds of the manufacturers were controlled
by this fear of economic loss and they closed the market upon all electricians
not members of the union. The position of Martin, the plaintiff, is one cf
peculiar hardship, because he has not refused to join the union. He has
been refused admission. His business has been ruined, not because he
was disloyal to his fellow-workmen, but because the defendants in the
exercise of despotic power have seen fit to crush him. He seeks redress in
two suits. First, he brings trespass and demands the damages he has
suffered in the destruction of his business. Second, he petitions equity to
open the market to him, to enable him to resume his occupation. He asks
that defendants be ordered to recall their threat, trusting that the mannfacturetrs will willingly sell to him when fear of the threat has been removed.
The learned court below assures us that he has carefully perused the
decisions in this and other states and that the plaintiff has no redress.
It would have been more enlightening had he told us the decisions that
had enjoyed his perusal. He tells us that at common law the defendants
would have gone to jail as criminals but that the legislature of Pennsylvania
has abolished this salutary rule. The acts of 1869, 1872, 1876 and 1891
did destroy the criminality of labor strikes but they did not say anything
about boycotts. They are still criminal conspiracies. The act of May 8,
18;9, simply declared if lawful for men to form trade unions for their
mutual "aid, benefit and protection, and peaceably to-meet, discuss and
establish all necessary bylaws, rules andI regulations." The act of June
14th, 1872, declared It lawful for workmen to refuse to work, either as in-
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dividuals or as unions, whenever they may be dissatisfied with their wages
or their treatment by their employers or when continuing at work would
be contrary to the rules of the union. This act only deprived a strike of
its criminality. It may still be a tort and the object of an injunction when
used as a means of pressure to compel the discharge of a fellow-employee,
Erdman v. Mitchell 207 Pa. 79. Further, the act expressly excepted cases
where the strike is used as a means of hindering other persons from secuing employment or from continuing at their work, such a strike remaining criminal. On Apr. 20, 1876, the exception was abolished and even such
a strike as In Erdman v. Mitchell (supra) Is now no longer criminal. The
only criminal method of hindering a man from continuing work or securing
employment is the use of force, threat or menace of harm to person or
property. The act of June 16, 1891, re-enacted the provisions of the laws
just reviewed with these additions. The act of 1872 had authorized a man
to strike- as an individual or as a member of a union. The act of 1891 declared lawful a strike of men in a body even though they had formed no
union, and not only for the causes mentioned in the act of 1872 but also
when to continue work would be contrary to the resolution of any meeting
the men may have held and which the particular defendant had attended.
The meeting of the men to devise and adopt ways and means to render
their resolutions effective were also declared to be no longer indictable,
so long as their resolutions did not violate the national or state constitlutions and they did not conspire to commit a felony.
It has been decided in a very noteworthy ca3e, (one evidently overlooked by the learned court below) that the acts of '69, '72 and '76 do not
apply to boycotting. Bracie Bros. v. Evans, 5 Pa. C. C. 163. This being so in
1888, and the act of 1891 being foreign from the subject, we conceive it to
be so today, but even If these acts did deprive the defendant's conduct of
criminality, they make no pretence of affecting the powers of equity or of
the court of common pleas. The legislature could not make this change,
if It would. Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79.
In Sweeney v. Torrence 1 Pa. Dist. Rep. 622 (1892), a union of dealers
In building materials refused to sell materials to certain contractors and
pe iaded others not to sell to them, the object being to drive the contractors out of business. The court recognized as settled that equity has
jurisdiction in such cases. But as the defendants simply exercised their
right to refuse to sell to plaintiffs and used persuasion to Induce others to do
likewise, no tort was committed. The court did say: "The defendants may
as Individuals use all lawful and peaceful means to induce others to refuse
to sell supplies and materials to the plaintiffs or any of them, or to deal
with them or any of them." But he followed it with this statement, "But
when the defendants or any of them organize or combine together, and by
force, threats, intimidation or menace of violence or harm, interfere with the
ile. of the plaintiffs, or Induce or persuade others to do so
l7aitivnate Iun,
they are guilty of acts constituting a nuisance." Notice that the court adds
the word "Intimidation" to the list of means forbidden to be used by the
act of 1876. An injunction was refused only because the affidavits did
not show such acts, and because there was no common Interest between
the plaintiffs which could be protected by an injunction. The defendants
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also were not then committing or threatendng any act dangerous to plaintiffs.
All defendant's acts had occurred long since and the court said the proper
remedy was by action at law or indictment.
Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. 420, was a similar case. During a strike in
the building trades in Pittsburg certain contractors conceded the demands
of the men. The other contractors in order to force these "scab" contractors into line in their resistance of the strike undertook to close the
lumber market to them. The association of contractors issued a circulac
to all lumber dealers asking them to withhold lumber from -the "scabs." A
certain retail dealer continued to supply the "scabs" and the association
then wrote to his source of supply and advised him that it would "be to his
advantage to discontinue supplying" the retailer who in turn was supplying
the "scabs." The wholesale dealer yielded to this veiled threat and cut off
the retailer's supply. The latter then sues the members of the association.
The jury found a verdict for $2500 damages. On the appeal, however, Justice Dean took a remarkable position. First, he held the combination of
contractors lawful because they were not attempting to lower the price of
labor below that fixed by supply and demand but were simply resisting an
effort to raise it beyond its natural level. i. e. they were acting in self
defense. It is submitted that however good an excuse this may be as
toward the strikers it is entirely irrelevant when the combination trained
its guns not on the strikers but on an innocent non-combatant whose only
offence was his refusal to take sides in the fight. Second, he held that the
plaintiff, though entirely disconnected with the strike, must bear the artificial closing of the wholesale market to him because he, by continuing to
retail lumber to contractors who conceded the advance, was aiding
some workmen to earn higher wages and contribute to the support of
their striking fellow-workmen.
It is submitted that this is an indefensible position. The plaintiff was
in the lumber business, not to aid contractors or to aid workmen, but to
make a living. Nevertheless, when contractors and workmen get to quarrelling, the plaintiff must stop his business for fear he may aid the workmen. That this aid to the workmen was indirect and unintentional makes
no difference. The fact that he was aiding them justified the defendants in
their effort to put him out of business during the strike. If a criminal in
his flight hide in my barn, must I submit to have my barn burned because
it is aiding him in his effort to conceal himself?
Lastly he declares that a threat to withdraw patronage is not a threat
in the legal sense. It only prompts a sordid calculation. One still has a free
choice. He considers which custom is most profitable and acts accordingly.
An illegal threat, says he, would be one suggesting bodily harm or villification in the newspapers or social ostracism, for they deter a man of ordinary courage from the prosecution of his business in accordance with his
own notions.
It Is submitted that this position -is as indefensible as the other. In
Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, a union of plumbers at work on a building
notified the contractor that if he continued to employ Erdman they would
strike. We submit, there is no difference in principle or in effect between
a threatened strike of customers and of workmen. Justice Dean again
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wrote the opinion for the court. He tactfully ignores his earlier decision
in Cote v. Murphy. He does not now talk about "sordid calculations" and
"free choice." He declares that the announcement of Mitchell to his employer that he must choose between him and Erdman was coercive in
effect. It constituted "intimidation." The announcement was made when
the building was at its critical stage. Mitchell controlled two-thirds of the
men on the job. "It is a waste of time," says Dean, "to more than state
the facts to convince that the conduct of defendants was calculated to
Intimidate both employes and employers, and consequently was unlawful."
He then expatiates on the inherent and indefensible right of man to acquire,
possess and protect property. The workingman's right to acquire property
by the free use of his hands, he declares to be indefeasible. "To exercise it
he must have the unrestricted privilege of working for such employers as
he chooses, at such wages as he chooses to accept." "Trades unions may
cease to work for reasons satisfactory to their members, but if they combine to prevent otlers from obtaining work by threats of a strike or combine to prevent an employer from employing others by threats of a strike,
they combine to accomplish an unlawful purpose, a purpose as unlawful
now as it ever was, though not punishable by indictment." * * * "It is
not important that apt language precisely ccrpressing the threat should have
been used; the meaning of their declarations and acts was well understood
by all parties."
Now, it is submitted, the meaning of the letter in Cote v. Murphy was
well understood by all parties. Dean, himself, treats it as a threat to withdraw patronage. It is hard to see why Cote's right to acquire property
through the profits of his lumber business was not just as indefeasible as
was that of Erdman to acquire property by his hands. It is hard to see why
Cote's right to an open lumber market was not as inherent as Erdman's
right to an open labor market. When nine-tenths of a man's customers
ar& union -men and they threaten to withdraw their custom it is idle to
talk of "sordid calculations" and "free choice." The dealer is as much
coerced to close the market on the one-tenth as the builder was coerced to
discharge Erdman. Cote may have been a valuable customer. He may have
sent large orders and have paid promptly, so that the wholesalers would
lose his patronage with great reluctance but if the only alternative is economic ruin, they close the market on him. Cote's offence was a refusal to
join the union of contractors and a refusal to obey their dictations. Erdman's offence was a refusal to join the labor union and obey its dictation.
Each man was punished for his independence. The one has an action, says
Dean, the other has not.
The only perceptible distinction between the cases is this-In Cote v.
Murphy, the fight was on. Cote was unintentionally, aiding the strikers.
The excuse for hurting him was self-interest. The cause of the desire to
hurt plaintiff was an event occurring at the time of the defendant's act.
In Erdman v. Mitchell, the defendants were applying the maxim, "In time of
peace, prepare for war." Their excuse for demanding Erdman's discharge
was to force him into the union. They sought to completely unionize the
trade, so that the next -strike would bring sure success. This, say the
courts, Is an object too remote for us to consider. We will only regard
your Immediate object of punishing Erdman and that Is unlawful. (Plant -.
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Woods, 176 Mass. 492. Strongly approved by Dean on p. 93 of Erdman v.
,Mitchell.) Yet in Cote v. Murphy how remote was the object! Cote's
market was closed because he sold to contractors, who gave men work,
who gave money to strikers. The immediate result in both cases was to
hurt a non-combatant. The ultimate object- in both cases was to win Izi
the economic struggle. Surely we should consider the ultimate object
whether the case be one of boycott aimed at a dealer or one aimed at a
workman. Or, if we must look at the immediate result, we should do so In
both cases.
However, whether Erdman v. Mitchell involves a reversal of Cote v.
Murphy or not, we have no hesitation In granting the present plaintiff
relief. Erdman v. Mitchell at least establishes that a threat of pecuniary
loss may be a means of intimidation. The plaintiff before us has the strong.
est equities. His application for membership is rejected by the union and
he Is to be driven out of business. As in Erdman v. Mitchell the plaintiff
is a workman and the defendants have combined to prevent his enjoying the
indefeasible right to acquire property by the use of his hands. The only
difference is that the market for electrical supplies has been closed on him,
instead of the doors of his employers being closed fn his face.
Whether it would have been actionable for the manufacturers of elec.
crical supplies to have agreed of their own volition to close the market
to the plaintiff is another question. This would depend on whether the
resolution was suggested by plaintiff's failure to pay his bills or whether
It was without lawful excuse. It Is true that some states take the position
that since one man has an absolute right to deal or not to deal with another
as he pleases and since also what one man has a right to do two or more
may combine to cease dealing with a third for a good reason, a bad reason,
or no reason at all. This was the position taken in Bowen v. Matherson.
96 Mass. 499 and Bohn Manufacturing Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn 233, cited
with approval In Cote v. Murphy. But this Is not law In Pennsylvania
for the second premise has never been accepted In Pennsylvania. On
page 427 -of Cote v. Murphy, Dean says-"AU the authorities of this state
go to show that while the act of an Individual may not be unlawful, yet the
same act, when committed by a combination of two or more, may be unlawful and, therefore, be actionable." One of the very Illustrations of such
in act given by Gibson In Com. v. Carlisle, Brightly's R. 39 Is the act whose
object Is the benefit of the conspirators but which involves the "oppression of
Individuals by unjustly subjecting them to the power of the conspiracy."
The extreme position of Bowen v. Matherson has since been abandoned
In Massachusetts, Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1. In this latter case It was
held actionable to compel an employer by threats of strike to pay a fine
imposed by the union for a violation of union rules. Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis.
supra was Just such a case.
The first American case decided on common law principles in which a
boycott was directed by workmen against a workman for the purpose of
depriving him of a market for his labor Is Lucke v. The Clothing Cutters'
'Union, 77 Md. 396. (1893.) As in the case at bar the union was seeking 'I
mhnopoly of the labor market. A recovery was allowed.
Macauley v. Tierney, 19 R. 1. 255,(1895) was a case identical In facts
with the case at bar. The only variation is that here the men were elec-
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trilians. There they. were plumbers. Ai injunction was refused but the
court took the position that an illegal conspiracy must involve the use of
unlawful means or have as its object an unlawful act, and this, as we have
seen, Is not the law in Pennsylvania. In Walsh v. Association of Plumbers
71 S. W. Rep. 455 (Mo.), 1902, a demurrer to a bill identical with the bill
in Macauley v. Tierney was overruled. It is a hopeless task to attempt to
reconcile these boycott cases. In his distinguished address delivered before
the Private Law Section of the C-ongress of Arts and Sciences St. Louis,
September 1904, Dean Lewis pointed out that two radically different
methods have been applied in ascertaining whether defendant has committed a tort. If we fix our attention primarily on the rights of the defendant
(as did the learned court below) we are apt to reach the conclusion that the
act is lawful. If we primarily regard the injury defendants have inflicted
on plaintiffs and look to see ii defendants had a legal excuse for doing so,
we will generally find for the plaintiff, for surely the usual object, the
securing of a monopoly of business or trade, is in conflict with the interests of the community at large and is, therefore, not a lawful excuse.
It is a most dangerous thing .to concede that there are any acts which
a man has an absolute legal right to do, irrespective of surrounding circumstances. The act of buying and selling goods or labor has gone unque.qtioned in the past because it was "never performed under circumstances
'hat shocked the moral sense of the community. The idea that there is
an inberent right to buy or sell, to work or not to work, as one pleases was
the natural result." But today when customers and workmen are so organized that -to resist their demands means the paralysis of one's business and
financial ruin, we find this seemingly innocent act being used as a means
of coercion quite if not more effective than physical force. Men of ordinary,
nay of extraordinary, nerve cannot withstand them. The military discipline
of labor unions demands and procures the instant obedience of orders.
Men have learned this from sad experience and now meekly take their orders from the union officers. Under such circumstances it Is time we
were abandoning the idea that a man has an inherent right to buy or sell
as he pleases and hold that be who deliberately injures his fellow man must
respond to him In damages unless he can show some just cause or excuse
for his act.
We reverse the court below in the tort action and order a new trial.
We also decree that the defendants notify the manufacturers that they may
sell to the plaintiff without fear and, we enjoin them to do nothing more
that will hinder the plaintiff in the prosecution of his business.
Judgment reversed.
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FARREL vs. TRILLOM.
Master and Servant-Negligence-Liability for Injury to Heaith of Servant.
-Risks Assumed by Servant-Contract-When Breach of Contract Occurs-Contributory Negligence.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
TrIllom employed Farrel as a domestic servant at $3.00 per week, and
stipulated that Farrel should sleep in the house. Trillom furnished him
a suitable room and bed. The room furnished was in the back of the house
and the roof being out of repair, rain came through it, dropping on the
bed, the floor and the walls. Farrel discovered this and complained to
Trillom, who said that if Farrel would stay with him he would have repairs
made Immediately, namely, within a week. The week elapsed and no
repairing was done. On the seventh day a heavy rain occurred. The bed
was wet and Farrel took a dangerous cold. He sues for damages.
Duffy for the plaintiff.
A master is liable for injuries which happen to his servant, In the
course of his employment, if caused by the master's negligence.
Johnson v. Bruner, 61 Pa. 61.
A master must furnish suitable instrumentalities for the work or duty
which he requires of his employees. Cadwell v. Brown, 53 Pa. 453;
Frazer v. Penna. R. R., 38 Pa. 104; Ill. Steel Co. v. Mann, 40 L. R. A. 784.
Davis for the defendant.
The servant was guilty of contributory negligence and is not entitled
to recover. Shaffer v. Haish, 110 Pa. 575; Catawissa R. R. Co. v. Armstrong, 49 Pa. 186; Ingram v. Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co., 148 Pa. 177.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
TOBIN, J.:-As this case has no direct precedent, we must decide ic.
on grounds of reason and analogy. The question involved is one of considerable Importance, a=d in this State It seems to be an open one. We
think it can only be settled by a decision of the Supreme Court.
It is the duty of the master-which he cannot delegate, and for a
breach of which he is liable to the servant, in case of personal injuriesto use ordinary care; to provide reasonably safe and suitable tools and
appliances; to provide reasonably safe premises; to pro-ide competent
fellow servants, and a sufficient number of them; to promulgate rules
where the nature of the work requires them; to instruct and warn the
young and inexperienced servants. The master is liable only for failure
to exercise reasonable care in rthe performance of These duties. He is not
an insurer. On entering the service a servant impliedly contracts that
he possesses the ordinary skill and experience of those engaged in the
occupation he undertakes, that he will exercise ordinary care to protect
himself while engaged in that occupation, and that he will assume the risks
of the employment, including the risks arising from the negligence of
fellow servants. But to this rule there are a number of exceptions. The
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principles under which d servant is held -to assume the risks of the employment do -not apply where the master has promised to remove the peril,
unless the danger is so immediate and imminent that an ordinarily prudent man would not continue in the service. See Hough vs. Railway Co.
100 U. S. 213. The risk will not be assumed if the duty to continue in
the dangerous service is required or justified by some emergency approved
by law. The servant by continuing in the service after knowledge of defects, is deemed to assume the risk himself. But if he complains of the
defect to the master, and the latter promises to remedy or repair it, the
servant by remaining on this assurance for a reasonable time in the service will not be deemed to have waived it, and the question of a reasonable
time will be for the jury. Patterson vs. Pittsburg & Connellsville Railroad Co., 76 Pa. 389. But if the defect is not remedied within the promised
time his remaining in the service is at his own risk. And when a master
has furnished implements perfect of their kind, but not designed for or
adapted to the performance of his work, and a servant objects to using
them on this account, but continues to use them he will be held to have
assumed the risk. The mere complaint of the servant will not be sufficient
unless the master expressly or impliedly promises to repair the defeot. In
this jurisdiction it is distinctly held that although the servant may have
been aware of the defect, yet if it was of such a nature that a man of
ordinary prudence would on account of it have abandoned the service, and
the servant continued therein, and was in consequence of the defect injured he may recover damages. The rule laid down by Mr. Justice Gordoa
in Patterson v Railroad Co., '76 Pa. 389, supra, is to the following effect:
"When the servant in obedience to the master incurs the risk of machinery, which though dangerous, is not so much so as to threaten immediate injury, or it is reasonably probable may be used safely with ordinary caution,
the master is liable for a resulting accident." We heartily concur in this
decision together with the numerous other cases cited by the learned coun.
sel. for the plaintiff. But they are all plainly distinguishable from the one
at bar. No prudent man of good common sense would ordinarily retire
to a wet bed after the time had expired in which the master of the house
had promised to repair the leak in the roof of the bedroom. We think
that all the cases cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, though
different from the one at issue in some respects, will justify us in concluding that the servant assumed the risk when he imprudently retired
to the wet bed after the expiration of the time in which the repairs were
to be made. The danger was so glaring that no prudent man would have
entered into it. In Sweeney v. Berlin & Jones Envelope Co., 101 N. Y.
520 the plaintiff was employed to work on a machine of an old pattern
which had not all the safeguards of newer machines. He worked on it
several years, and then told the owner's superintendent that it ought to have
an additional safe guard. The superintendent promised to attend to h,
but it was not furnished, and the plaintiff was required to continue to work
with it under threat of being discharged if -he refused. He complied and
was injured. it was held that the master was not liable. Although a
servant does not assume the risk of defective machinery, by remaining a
reasonable time in the employment, after -the master has promised to repair
the same, yet the contrary is the case if he remains after such period has
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elapsed. 14 Am. & Eng. Ency., 856; Patterson vs. R. R. Co., 76 Pa. 389,
supra; Hough v. Ry. Co., 100 U. S. 213-225; Stephenson v. Duncan, 73
Wis. 404; Conroy v. Vulcan Iron Works, 62 Mo. 35. It was held in a case
hta arose In Tennessee that an employee who continues in an employmeit
after the expiration of the time within which the master had promised to
repair defects without repairs being made, assumes the risk. Trotter v.
Chattanooga Furniture Co., 101 Tenn. 257. The fact that the plaintiff continues In the defendant's service after the expiration of the time in which
repairs were to'be made justifies the court as a matter of law in declaring
him guilty of negligence. If the promise is not performed in a reasonable
time, and the servant continues in the employment, an inference arises ,,f
new terms having been agreed upon, and .the servant cannot recover. The
reason of this is said to be (Clark v. Holmes,. 7 H. & N. 937) that there
is contributory negligence on the part of the servant; but it is suggested
in Shearman on Negligence, Sec. 97, that the true ground is that the servant has waived the objection and induced the master to suppose that i.
is waived or, as we are inclined to say the servant has renewed the service *accepting the risk. If the servant undertook the performance of his
duties, the danger of which he fully comprehended, the fact that he undertook it unwillingly and for fear of losing his employment will not relieve
him of the assumption of the risk incident thereto. 20 Am. & Eng. Ency.
2nd. Ed. 120. Negligence is always a question for the jury when there ;s
any doubt as to the facts or the inferences to be drawn.
Under the principles of law well established and heretofore universally
applied, when there -are no facts upon which reasonably and legitimately
a liability can be based, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant.
Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
If the arrangement between Farrel and Trillom could be treated as a
letting of the room there would be no warranty that the room was habitable, from the mere fact of letting.
Farrel, however, had the power to vacate the premises, and avoid the
risk of cold. Tritlom promised to repair within a week, and -in consideration of the promise, Farrel agreed to remain and remained. If Trillom had
-"iolated this contract, an action could be sustained upon it. But, when the
rain occurred, and Farrel's sickness was caused, the week had not elapsed,
within which the repairing was to be done. How extensive these repairs
needed to be does not appear, nor whether, not bgun till the seventh day,
they could have been finished before its expiration. The sickness was contracted before the expiration of the week, and therefore, before the breach,
and not in consequence of the breach of the contract. Whether Farrel left
immediately after contracting the illness, we know not- If he did, he would
have discharged Trillom from .the duty of repairing afterwards. There was
no breach of the contract to repair within a week, when the cold was caught
by Farrel.
There was strictly, no negligence on the part of Trillom, unless we are to
say that every failure to do what we ought to do or every doing of what
we ought not to do, Is negligence. One ought to refrain from stealing; But
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is theft negligence? One ought to pay a debt; But isomission to pay It
negligence? Trillom so far as aptpears did exactly what he intended to do.
He knew the state of the roof, and the consequences. He did not Intend
to repair earlier than the end of the week. In order to make him liable,
it will be necessary to find that he ought to have repaired tho roof before
the rain, the effect of which caused the sickness.
He was under no duty to any one, to repair his roof, prior to the occupancy of the room by Farrel He contracted with Farrel that the latter
should occupy the room, and sleep there. It was unreasonable in him to
desire or expect Farrel to occupy a room, if wet, or to suppose that Farrel,
in entering into the service, was expecting to occupy a wet room and bed.
When B employs A to do work, he expects A to encounter and A expects
to encounter the visible and ordinary risks, but A does not expect to -be exposed to avoidable, and unusual and invisible risks, nor does B believe
that A so expects. B is under a duty to furnish an ordinarily safe place,
and safe machines, and other safe conditions of the work. A similar principle applies to the parties here. Trillom ought to have furnished a room
and bed which Farrel could occupy without imperilling health and life. If
Farrel, ignorant that the roof was in disrepair, and consequently that he
-,as running risk, had while occupying the room been overtaken with rain,
and been thus made ill, he could reasonably have demanded compensation.
But Farrel learned -before his contracting the illness, that the roof
leaked, and that rain came through, and dampened the bcd, floor and walls.
He knew, as well as Trillom, the probable effect of his sleeping in the room
in case of rain. He expostulated with Trillom, and evidently threatened
to leave. This he would have had the right to do. He was induced to remain by a promise to repair within a week. He remained for the week. He
knew that a rain ight occur within that time, and that, if it did and the
repairs had not been made, his room would become wet. Why did he take
that risk?
It is not necessary to say that he was negligent in doing so. That
would depend on circumstancees. Possibly he could not have found atLother place, and in remaining would have undergone no greater hazard
than In going. We do not know. But, he took the risk, and the consequence was disastrous. The violation of the express contract to repair within the week, was not the cause of this disaster. Was there an implied contract of any sort? Trillom might have said to Farrel, Stay with me, I will
repair within a week, and I will indemnify you if you should suffer harm,
before the repair is done. But did he do that? either expressly or Impliedly? We are not able to add this to the contract that he actually made.
He intended that Farrel should take the risk of rain within a week, and
Farrel intended to take that risk. Neither expected to give or receive compensation for the possible but improbably mischievous result.
It might be said that Trillom ought not to have persuaded Farrel to
take the risk. It may equally well be said that Farrel ought not to have
been persuaded. He was not a youth, or ignorant, or unable to take care
of himself. He resolutely announced his purpose to leave, unless he obtained
assurance of rather early repair. Are we to adopt the principle that if B
solicits A to take a risk for him, which A understands just as well as he,
he is to be responsible to A for any resulting injury?
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Trillom used we know not what persuasion. Did he say, there isn't
much chance of rain before I make the repairs? or if it rains that the rain
will dampen the room? or if it dampens the room, that you will be made
sick? Whatever the arguments, Farrel was as competent to judge their
value as Trillom. There are cases in which an employe has been held justified in relying on assurances of the employer, that he could safely continue to work despite a visible risk, but the reason was, or ought to have
been that the employer had a larger knowledge of the subject to which with
becoming modesty, the employe might reasonably submit. This is not such

a case.
Judgment affirmed.
LETTER FROM PROF. WIGMORE.
The following letter from Prof. Wigmore, author of the great work on
Evidence, explains itself.
Chicago, April 29, 1906.
Dear Professor Trickett
Many thanks for your article on Presumptions, which I should have
acknowledged before this. It is gratifying to note that my thought on that
subject has awakened such a powerful echo of consonance. You have demonstrated 3n careful detal, the entire fallacy of that notion, and I take
great pleasure in thinking that my bold challenging of it has been so amply
defended by such powerful logic. I knew I was right, but you have proved
it. I shall take the liberty of citing your article in my supplement next
year.
With much regard,
Very truly Yours
JOHN H. WIGMORE.

BOOK REVIEW
The Creation of Corporations for Profit in Pennsylvania, by John F. Whitworth. T. & J. W. Johnson Company, 1906.
Association for business purposes, is now largely effected under the form
For the formation of corporations each state has its own
of corporations
peculiar methods, and the principles by which the rights and duties of stockholders and officers are regulated are not uniform in the various jurisdictions. The author of the work whose title surmounts this notice is an officer
of large experience in the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth and
has already done notable work, as a writer in various important fields. His
book on the corporation statutes has been for some years in the hands of
the profession. The present work develops the law of the decisions with
admirable lucidity and completeness. Full instructions with forms, are
given for the obtaining of charters. It is of convenient size and beautifully
printed. The matter is arranged with a view to convenience. The Index Is
well made. It is possible to commend this book to the bar of Pennsylvania
with full assurance that lawyers who procure and use it under the influence
of this notice, will never reflect unkindly on its commendatory words.

